U.S.-Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism. ACES Working Paper No. 9, 2007 by Shoham, Amir
ICES- El CENTEI 
El CENTEIIF EXCELLENCE 
RESEARCH GIANTS 
& 
WilliNG PAPER SERIES 
#9 
AY2116-IJ 
US Israel Foreign Direct Investment and Terrorism 
by 
Dr. Amir Shoham 
ACES I EU CENTER RESEARCH SEED GRANT 2007 
I 
ABSRACT 
The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its 
creation. The focus of our study is how terrorism's impacts the level of production of 
the high-tech sector. 
The two main objectives and novelties of the paper are: First our paper can be 
a major contribution to as yet a new subfield in applied microeconomics attempting to 
measure the impact of terror on economic issues like FDI and Industry output in 
general and that focused on the High-Tech industries. Second our research is 
designed to help us understand the impact of terror news, especially on U.S citizens' 
reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable isn't how many bodies or but how 
many negative articles regarding terror there are in leading American news paper. We 
focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in major US financial 
papers and its impact on high-tech production and FDI to Israel. 
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Introduction 
The Israeli economy has been subjected to a continuous flow of terror since its 
creation. Terror has traditionally been defined as the "intentional use of violence 
against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims."1 In 
particular, continuous terror is expected to have economic consequences on a 
country's GDP, tourist sector, R&D policy, fmancial markets, among others? The 
focus of our research is on terrorism's ability to effect the production of the high-tech 
sector that is mainly soled in foreign markets like the U .S and is based on foreign 
direct investments (FDI) originating from the United States. The focus on US-Israel 
FDI to the high tech sector is due to that fact that this flow represents approximately 
75 percent of the total investment3 
FDI like any other financial flows are generated because of the future returns 
that can be expected. Because these returns are uncertain and depend on unknowable 
future developments, the value of these FDI flows requires forecasts of the 
distribution of these returns based on the best information available today. As time 
passes, investors get new information on future events and revalue the returns. On a 
fundamental level the volatility of returns is due to the arrival of new information. 
The actual effect on the value of FDI will depend on the local macro economic 
condition of the host country, the specific project and world markets for the products 
especially in the high-tech sector. If a terrorist effect reduces the flow of FDI and the 
latter is an important element of the host economy the resulting negative ripple effect 
1 Ganor .1998. ''Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?"" 
http: I lwww .i et. or g.i I/ articles/ define. h tm. 
2 On terror in Israel see Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), who found a 5% reduction in Israel's GDP over 
the 2000-03 period due to Palestinian terror and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) who found that terror 
negatively affected tourism in IsraeL 
3 See Avnimelech and Teubal (20Q6). 
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will have an adverse impact on a specific project. If the reporting of the terrorist 
attach has no general macro repercussions the impact on an FDI project may be 
negligible. We are therefore not surprised to fmd higher volatility in a period of 
terrorist activity even if we have a constant long term flow of terror. This slow 
moving volatility clustering can provide FDI cycles of several years or longer. 
One can also expect high frequency volatility. When an act of terror is 
reported the market will not inunediately be able to estimate its value on FDI flows. 
Agents may disagree and may rest on information of others, the heard mentality. 
Others may discount the accepted forecasts and re-assess their FDI decisions. This 
process of evaluating the information of terror incidence will result in high volatility 
of FDI flows. 
The literature 
Although studies investigating the impact of terrorism on economic activity 
are relatively new, they are quickly gaining popularity following the events of 
September I I, 2001.4 The research estimating the impact of terror on the economy is 
in its first stages. There are a few works about terror but it primarily focuses on the 
impact of terror and tourism (Enders and Sandler,I991; Downes-Le Guin and 
Hoffman, 1993; Sloboda, 2003; !to and Lee, 2005). Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 
(2004) claim that terrorism's impact on various aspects of the economy including 
tourism, FDI, savings and consumption, investment, stock markets, foreign trade, 
urban economy and national income and growth. Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides 
(2004) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) discovered that terrorist attack in a 
country reduces its GDP growth. A study by the World Bank (2002) on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict estimates that its cost on the Israeli economy is about 4 
4 See Barth et.al. (2006) for a literature review. 
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percent of GDP. Furthermore, Gupta, Clements, Bhattacharya and Chakravarti (2004) 
fmd that terrorism has a significant positive effect on the govermnent budget this 
additional fiscal cost effect GDP growth. Tavares (2003) terrorism study found to 
have a negative and significant impact on growth in real GDP per capita. However, 
when taking into account other determinants of growth, such as exports, size of 
govermnent, and spending on education, terrorism is no longer significant. There are 
also some studies that claim that terror has a small direct cost on capital stock in the 
U.S ( Navarro and Spencer, 2001). Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) find that a 100 
percent increase in the number of terrorist incidents is found to reduce bilateral trade 
by about 4 percent. 
Even on Israeli terrorism there are just a few articles from the economic 
perspective and even they deal mostly with the local effect and not with a bilateral 
affect (Eldor and Melnick 2004; Levy and Galili, 2006). Fleischer and Buccola 
(2002) found that the Israeli hotel industry was negatively impacted by terrorism 
between 1992 and 1998 because revenues from foreign visitors dropped. The net loss 
increased with the deterioration of the situation in 1996. Drakes and Kutan (2003) 
used monthly data from 1991 to 2000 to investigate the effect of terrorism on tourism 
in Greece, Israel and Turkey. They found significant negative effects. Fielding 
(2003) focused on the impact of terror on aggregate savings in Israel. He calculated 
terror by the number of deaths in Israel during 1989-1999. He estimates that if the 
number of fatalities in Israel decreased by its average level, consumption would fall 
by over 7%. The savings ratio in Israel would double if a complete cessation of 
violence occurs. Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) using V AR methodology estimate with 
quarterly data for the Israeli economy from 1950-2003, that there is a significant 
effect of terrorism on consumption. Berrebi and Klor (2005) find that terrorism has 
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no significant impact on the average stock-market valuation oflsraeli fmns. This is 
due to a positive effect on defense stocks that offsets a negative effect on non-defense 
stocks. 
Terrorism affects FDI flows because foreigners can choose among many 
countries and projects, some of which are not subject to terrorism. Enders and Sander 
(1996) research on Spain find that terrorism has been estimated to have reduced 
annual FDI inflow by 13.5% on average for the period 1975-1991. They also 
estimated that terror in Greece reduced FDI on average by 11.9% annually. This 
translates into a loss in FDI amounting to almost $400 million. Because FDI is an 
important source of savings, investment and economic growth are negatively affected 
in countries on the receiving end of terror. Moreover, the transfer of technological 
know-how into the country is reduced. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2005) examine the 
impact of terrorism on FDI which, they hypothesize, may be greater than its impact on 
economic growth. In most cases their 'terrorism index' is found to be negatively 
related to net FDI. Moreover, a one standard deviation increases in terrorism leads -
on average- to a decrease in the ratio of net FDI to GDP of between 4.16 and 6.54 
percentage points. Investigating the effects of terror on economic variables is clearly 
an important issue of research that more studies and resources have to be devoted to 
(Briick and Wickstr6m,2004). 
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Objectives 
The novelty of the research lies in two main issues. First after the 'September 
11' world trade center terror attack, the world has become more aware of the risks of 
terror. This risk impacts the economy and lives today more then ever. But the 
economy research and literature is still in its first steps. Furthermore, most of the new 
research is on transnational terrorism because it appears to be one of the greatest 
concerns for the international community while at the same time neglecting the local 
terror that a lot of countries and communities deal with. This research can be a major 
contribution to the effect oflocal terror on economic issues like production and FDI to 
the high-tech industries. 
In order to measure the impact of terror and its volatility on FDI we must frrst 
understand why FDI flows change. FDI are international assets which are purchased 
and owned because of the future payments that can be expected. Because these 
payments are uncertain and depend upon unknowable future developments, the fair 
price of these FDI assets will require forecasts of the distribution of these payments 
based on our best information today. As time goes by, we get more information on 
these future events and re-value the asset. So at a basic level, financial price volatility 
is due to the arrival of new information. Volatility clustering is simply clustering of 
information arrivals. The fact that this is common to so many assets is simply a 
statement that news is typically clustered in time. 
The second contribution of our research is to try to understand the impact of 
terror news, especially on U.S citizens' reactions to terror in Israel. Our terror variable 
is different from the ones researches are using today. Our terror variable isn't how 
many bodies, casualties or events that occur but how many negative articles regarding 
terror there are in leading American news paper, and its location in the media. 
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Consequently we focus on the volatility clustering of terror information arrivals in 
major US fmancial papers. 
Our research deals mainly how American investors to the high-tech and start 
up sectors react to volatility of terror in Israel and how production that is mainly 
exports in the high-tech sector is affected by this volatility. We investigate the high-
tech industry for a number of reasons. High-tech companies, and particularly start-
ups, are viewed as mobile enterprises that can transfer their operations to a different 
country with relative ease for a wide variety of reasons, consequently sensitive to 
terror volatility. Another explanation for why the high-tech sector should be less 
affected by local conditions is that the risk in investing in start-up companies is so 
high that the marginal risk of a security situation is rendered virtually meaningless. 
Furthermore, the products developed by domestic high-tech enterprises are designed 
for foreign markets and not for the relatively small domestic market.5 In the last 
decade the Israeli high -tech industry has become the leading industry of the Israeli 
economy. Its business cycle heavily impacts the Israeli economy business cycle. In 
the first eight month of2006 73% of the Israeli exports were from the high-tech or 
semi high-tech industries (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2006). A substantial portion 
of the FDI invested in the Israeli high tech industry comes from the USA. 
Consequently the focus on the US-Israel bilateral relationship on the volatility of 
terror is crucial. Furthermore, the results of this research should be of interest to other 
countries that attempt to attract US FDI investors or sale to the U.S market. 
Consequently our research questions become more specific: 
I. To what extent does terror affect production in the high-tech sector? 
2. What time Jag there is between terror actions and real effect on production? 
5 In 2005 approximately 75 percent of the Israeli high tech sector was destined for exports. See Central 
Bureau of Statistics (2006). 
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3. Do global conditions like global growth have bigger affects than local environment 
variables like terror on FDI and production? 
Data and variables 
The depended variable in this test is the industrial product index ( seasonality 
was neutralized) of the Israeli high-tech sector. 
The variable that we use as an indicator for the world economy is the 
NASDAQ composite index. Sulla and Ben-Horin (2000) found that the NASDAQ 
composite index had the greatest impact on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, and 
therefore may serve as the best indicator of the effect of the American economy on 
Israel and particularly on the Israeli high-tech industry. 
The additional and most unique variable that we use in this study is the 
number of articles about Israel that appeared in The New York Times. We use The 
New York Times as an indicator of the extent and type of exposure the Israeli local 
environment as interpreted in the U.S.A. We intend to broaden this information base 
to other leading financial papers. This will let us also interpret the investors choice of 
source of 'reliable' information. 
The empirical research will examine the extent to which the NASDAQ and the 
exposure of the local environment affect the Israeli high-tech sector. It will examine 
the link between the change in the log of the industrial product index (DLNI) as a 
factor of the change in the log of the NASDAQ (DLNN) and the change in the 
number of articles mentioning Israel in The New York Times (DSUM). As a first cut 
approximation we examined the data with a simple V AR model. The test was 
performed on the sample of data we have collected thus far, spanning the period 
January 1996 to October 2002. This data sample was collected on a monthly basis. 
We started the sample in 1996 because the Internet revolution emerged in full force in 
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the mid-1990s. Just as the electric revolution provided a major stimulus to industry, so 
to the Internet revolution gave a major boost to globalization by opening up rapid 
channels of communication that have shortened the distance between countries and 
transformed the world into a global village. 
Results 
Table !presents our test results using a simple V AR model results for 1996-
2002. The results are backed up by a Granger causality test that was significant (p 
value<0.005) for the NASDAQ explanation and The New York Times explanation. 
The Adj. R-squared is 0.54. 
T bl I V a e : anance D ecompos1tlon o fDLNI 
Period DLNI DLNN DSUM 
I 100.0000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 83.73397 5.204752 11.06128 
3 66.35313 6.381135 27.26574 
4 64.28932 10.65737 25.05332 
5 64.07284 10.53851 25.38864 
6 63.04426 11.29482 25.66092 
7 57.45698 13.72182 28.82120 
8 53.61919 11.75550 34.62531 
9 53.46453 11.59847 34.93701 
10 55.00269 10.78505 34.21226 
11 54.63303 12.24126 33.12570 
As can be seen from the reported results the Israeli high-tech industrial 
product index is much more sensitive to local conditions (DSUM) as it is reflected in 
the Americana media rather than by events in the global economy (DLNN). In Figure 
I we can see the impulse response function. This shows a positive shock of one 
standard deviation in the DLNN will have virtually no effect on DLNI throughout the 
first year after the shock. At the same time, a positive shock in the DSUM, meaning 
more articles about Israel in the newspaper (mainly negative due to terror and security 
situation), have a negative effect after two months and an additional negative effect 
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shows eight months later on the DLNI. In our opinion the first slump is the outcome 
of fewer orders by American firms and customers, and the second slump is an 
outcome ofless FDI. 
Figure! 







This result proved to be surprising since we had assumed that the high-tech 
industry would be less affected by local conditions. The reason for this conclusion 
was that high-tech companies and particularly start-ups are viewed as mobile 
enterprises that can transfer their operations to a different country with relative ease. 
If the high-tech industry is negatively impacted by negative reporting of local 
conditions (e.g. terror) during volatile times, it is certain that other industries with a 
large degree of mobility will be even more negatively affected. 
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